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Abstract: In this paper, we conduct a high stake experiment in rural China to investigate the 
determinants of individual and joint decisions regarding intertemporal choices, and estimate 
the relative influence of spouses on the joint decisions. We use the Convex Time Budget 
experimental method to elicit individual and joint decisions on how much money to allocate 
to an early and a later date. We find that the rates of return have significant effects on the 
decisions, yet both individual and joint decisions exhibit present-biased time preferences. We 
also find that both spouses have a significant influence on joint decisions. However, husbands 
have a stronger influence than wives. Although there are few individual and household 
characteristics related to the relative influence, we do find a link between relative influence in 
the experiment and households’ decisions on financial savings in real life. We also find that 
neither the order of the individual and joint decisions nor the initial control of the endowment 
in the joint decision affects the behavior in the experiment.  
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 relative influence. 
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1. Introduction 
Intertemporal choices concerning, e.g., savings, investments, education, and insurance are 
important determinants of household development. Although household decisions on such 
choices are often made jointly, they depend on a number of factors including the preferences 
of the individual household members making the decision and the bargaining position of each 
individual. Previous research for example shows that who is in control of the resources could 
have important implications for decisions relating to children health and nutrition (Thomas, 
1990, 1994), household expenditure patterns (Phipps and Burton, 1998), and children’s 
education (Namoro and Roushdy, 2008). The approach of these studies is to compare 
households where the woman has relatively strong control over the assets with households 
where the woman has little control over the assets. Another approach is to study how the 
control of income or access to financial assets in the households is exogenously changed by 
external public programs (Hashemi et al., 1996; Lundberg et al., 1997; Duflo, 2003; Pitt et al., 
2006; Bobonis, 2009) or field experiments (De Mel et al., 2009; Ashraf, 2009; Ashraf et al., 
2010; Mani, 2010; Robinson, 2011). These studies consistently find the importance of 
financial control in improving women’s decision power and the allocation decisions of the 
household. Finally, an alternative approach to measure the influence of individual decision on 
joint household decision is to use laboratory or artefactual experiments (de Palma et al., 2011; 
Carlsson et al., 2009, 2011). Apart from having control over the decision environment, the 
perhaps main advantage is that both individual and joint decisions can be observed and related 
to each other. 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of both spouses’ individual and joint decisions 
regarding intertemporal trade-offs, and to what extent the joint decisions are influenced by the 
individual preferences. We do this by conducting a high stake experiment where subjects 
decide how much money to allocate to an early and a later date. Relatively few studies have 
looked at households’ intertemporal choices. Instead, factors such as risk taking (Bateman and 
Munro, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2009; de Palma et al., 2011; Abdellaoui et al., 2011), stated 
preferences (Quiggin, 1998; Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Strand, 2007; Beharry-Borg et 
al., 2009), public good provisions (Iversen et al., 2011; Peters et al., 2004) and social 
dilemmas (Cochard et al., 2009) have been studied. However, Abdellaoui et al. (2011) 
compare the difference between individuals’ and couples’ intertemporal and risk preferences, 
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and find that couples make more patient decisions than the corresponding individual decisions. 
Moreover, the study by Carlsson et al. (2011) is similar to ours, since it also investigates 
intertemporal choices within households in rural China. There are, however, some important 
differences that make the current paper a novel contribution as well. Both Abdellauoui et al. 
(2011) and Carlsson et al. (2011) use a multiple price list elicitation method (Coller and 
Williams, 1999) that has been used extensively in time preference experiments (see, e.g., 
Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison et al., 2005; Andersen et al., 2006, 2008; Reuben et al., 2010; 
Tanaka et al., 2010). A multiple price list method is designed to elicit subjects’ time 
preferences by having them make multiple choices between smaller rewards in the sooner 
dates and larger rewards in the later dates. The time discounting rates can then be calculated 
based on the points at which subjects switch from sooner choices to later choices. While the 
method is fairly simple for subjects, it often results in high discount rates (upwards-biased) 
due to the assumption of linear utility (Frederick et al., 2002). In addition, the amount of 
information gained is rather limited, since what is observed is at what point subjects switch, or 
which of two options is chosen. An additional difference is that we investigate a number of 
potential order effects that could affect the decisions (as described further down). 
In this paper, we employ the Convex Time Budget (CTB) experimental method suggested by 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) to elicit individual and couple’s time preferences. This method 
allows us to collect substantial information about both individual and joint decisions. It also 
provides the possibility to test respondents’ understanding of the experimental environment, 
and quantify how respondents change their intertemporal allocations from individual 
decisions to joint decisions. Although this method has been applied in the field in Malawi by 
Gine et al. (2012), we modify the experimental design with special emphasis on how 
individual decisions affect joint decisions. The experiment is high stake with the average 
household payments corresponding to four or five days of non-farm wages of one local full-
time worker. In the experiment, each spouse had to make 10 independent choices—five for 
each of two timeframes. The first timeframe relates to the very near future, i.e., allocation of 
money between today and one month from today. The second timeframe concerns allocation 
of money between two months from today and three months from today. Each choice 
corresponds to one of five different rates of return for waiting; the rates of return for waiting 
increase from the first to the fifth choice. Hence, each respondent needed to trade off different 
time frames and different rates of return for waiting. The spouses also made the same choices 
jointly. Using the framework in Carlsson et al. (2011), we can relate the individual choices to 
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the choices made jointly and investigate to what extent the husband and wife influence joint 
decisions. Moreover, we can investigate whether the influence in the experiment is correlated 
with household and individual characteristics such as income and education, and with the 
households’ actual decisions on savings. 
There are several potential order effects that could affect how subjects respond. Hence, we 
control for both the order between the individual and joint decisions, and the order of the 
different parts of the time preference experiment. Moreover, we control for the effect of who 
has initial control over the tokens in the joint decision. 
We find that both wives’ and joint decisions are generally more patient than husbands’ 
decisions, and that both individual and joint decisions suffer from present time bias.  The rates 
of return have significant and positive effects on later allocations, which confirms that the 
respondents can understand the trade-offs between choices well. However, only a few 
observable characteristics are correlated with the individual and joint decisions. We find that 
both husbands and wives have an influence on the joint decisions. However, the husband on 
average has a stronger influence than the wife. The level of influence of the spouses and the 
relative influence is only correlated with a few observable individual and household 
characteristics such as the wife’s education, the length of marriage, the number of children, 
etc. However, we find that there is a link between relative influence in the experiment and the 
households’ decisions on financial savings in real life. Husbands who are the main decision 
makers with respect to savings also have a stronger influence on joint decisions in the 
experiment. We also find that neither the order of the individual and joint decisions nor the 
initial control of the endowment in the joint decision affects the behavior in the experiment. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the experimental 
design and procedure in detail. Section 3 presents the econometric framework. We describe 
and discuss empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Experimental design and procedure 
2.1 Location of the experiment and description of the sample 
The experiment was conducted in two poor counties of the Gansu province, which is located 
in the northwest of China. The province is one of the poorest provinces in China due to its 
severely dry climate. The two counties, Linxia and Jingning, were randomly selected. They 
are located in the southwestern and southeastern parts of the province, respectively. Linxia 
5 
 
County is home to diverse groups of minorities, which account for around 41% of the 
population. In each county, we randomly chose three townships, and in total 13 villages were 
randomly selected. 1  
The locations of our sample villages provide a favorable setting for the experimental study on 
intertemporal choices. Most importantly, the malfunctioning local credit institutions have 
largely limited farmers’ financial opportunities in rural China. In our sample, around 50% of 
the households complain that they are unable to loan from the credit institutions because they 
are poor. Even if 20% of the sample households have had loans from the local credit 
cooperative, the loans have been very small.2 Moreover, only 7% of the households report 
that they have savings in the local bank. The absence of alternative saving products in rural 
China has limited the possibilities of short-term savings. It is also very hard to borrow 
substantial amounts of money from relatives and friends to deal with big negative economic 
shocks. In addition to the thin external financial market, the areas are almost autarkic. Due to 
the small agricultural production, almost all sample households are self-sufficient in grain 
output. 3  It is thus difficult for the participating households to smooth their income and 
consumption in their daily life. 
In eight of the 13 sampled villages, we randomly chose 10 to 25 households with official 
marital status from the village registration list provided by the village leaders. In the other five 
villages, we randomly selected around five households in each village, also with official 
marital status. With the assistance of one village cadre, two randomly matched enumerators 
(always one man and one woman) approached the selected households. If both the husband 
and wife voluntarily agreed to be interviewed after our welcome announcement, the village 
cadre left. If one of the spouses was not home when the enumerators arrived at their house, 
the enumerators waited for a while or made an appointment to come back later. We had to 
make sure to interview the selected households in each village within one day in order to keep 
information about the experiment from spreading. If an appointment could not be made or if 
                                                          
1 We originally planned to randomly select two villages in each township. But one village was spread out, and it 
was hard to reach all households due to the bad road conditions after raining. We could therefore only interview 
15 households in that village. Therefore an additional 10 households were randomly selected from the 
neighborhood village.  
2 On average, each household can loan only around 5,000 Chinese yuan.  
3 On average, the proportion of agricultural income and off-farm income in total income is 22% and 53%, 
respectively. 
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one spouse in a couple refused to be interviewed 4, the enumerators visited the neighbor 
instead. Finally, 164 couples agreed to voluntarily participate in the experiment.  
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of the sampled households. The average ages of the 
husbands and wives are 49 and 46 years, respectively. On average, the husbands have five 
years of education and the wives 2.5 years. As regards individual questions, husbands and 
wives have surprisingly similar responses. For example, the average income contribution to 
the households of the wives is around 40%. Husbands are the main decision makers in 
everyday life, but wives have more decision power when it comes to daily expenses such as 
food and clothes. As for the common household characteristics, the average household has 
five members, and the average length of marriage is 26 years. In 2010, the average 
household’s gross income per capita was 7,064 yuan.5 
<Table 1 about here> 
2.2 Experimental design 
We apply the Convex Time Budget method suggested by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) to 
investigate subjects’ intertemporal choices. In Table 2, the 10 intertemporal choice sets for 
each respondent are described. There are only two timeframes with the same delay time:6 the 
near period between today and one month from today and the far period between two months 
and three months from today. To investigate whether respondents have present-biased 
preferences, we use “today” not “tomorrow” in the experimental design. However, this could 
imply different transaction costs between payment today and future payments (Anderson et al., 
2008). To investigate how the credibility of future payment affects respondents’ decisions in 
the experiment, before respondents started to make decisions, we asked questions about how 
they trusted they would receive the money in the future.  The five interest rates we used in the 
experiment were tested and decided upon based on the results of the pilot experiment. 7 
                                                          
4 Three households refused to be interviewed. Among them, two households could not participate in the survey 
mainly because the wife stated they were too busy. One household refused to continue the experiment when the 
enumerators told them they could obtain some payments from our experiment. They did not tell us the concrete 
reason—they just did not want to continue.  
5 At the time of the experiment, 1 USD=6.59 CNY. 
6 As we will discuss later, this design limits what information we can obtain from our parametric model, since 
we are not varying the delay time. The main reason for still choosing this design was that from the pilot studies it 
was clear that using more than 20 decisions would result in fatigue among a potentially large number of subjects. 
Moreover, since the main objective of the experimental design is to investigate the relationship between 
individual and joint decisions, we do not think the constant delay will matter much for our main results.  
7 During the pilot studies, we first used the interest rates used by Gine et al. (2012), i.e., 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 
1. However, especially at the high interest rates, there were almost no trade-offs; hence we reduced the rates to 
0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.4, and 0.6. 
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Respondents needed to allocate the given 20 tokens8 between a sooner and a later date with 
increasing interest rates.  
<Table 2 about here> 
As described in detail below, subjects were presented with two plates. The red plate 
represented the sooner date (today or two months from today) and the orange plate 
represented the later date (one month from today or three months from today). Their task was 
to decide how many tokens to put on each plate, where in all choices each token was worth 2 
yuan if it was allocated to the red plate. One token was worth 2×(1+r) yuan if it was allocated 
to the orange plate. r is the rate of return for waiting, and it increased from the first choice to 
the fifth choice.  
The spouses made both individual and joint decisions. As described below the order was 
randomly determined. When they made the individual choices they were clearly told that the 
money was theirs, and when the made the joint choices they would receive the same amount 
each. The basic idea of the analysis is to relate the decisions made individually to the 
decisions made jointly. It is of course possible that the individual choices are made taking into 
consideration the preferences of the spouse, and we have no way to control for that. However, 
what we did was to stress that the choices were anonymous to the spouse and that the money 
was individual and not to be paid to the household. 
2.3 Experimental procedure 
We employed and trained 10 interviewers, from now on called experimenters, to conduct the 
experiment. Among them, five were from Beijing University and five were from the local 
university. The five local experimenters could understand and speak the local dialect. All 
experiments were conducted by pairs of experimenters where one experimenter was from the 
local university.  
Once a couple had agreed to participate in the whole survey, one of the experimenters gave a 
brief introduction of the tasks. Then the couple together answered a set of questions about the 
household. The rest of the procedure depended on the order of the parts of the experiment (see 
Section 2.4). However, we will for simplicity only describe in detail one of the orders used. 
                                                          
8 The main reason for why we use tokens instead of Chinese Yuan is that the total amount of money varies in 
each decision since it depends on the interest rate and amount of money allocated to the earlier date.  
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In the version where individual decisions were made before the joint decisions, the 
respondents were (following the first initial questions) physically separated into two rooms 
where they could not hear each other; one experimenter followed the wife and one followed 
the husband. The experimenter read out the experimental instructions to the respondent. The 
respondent needed to make 10 separate decisions, and one of these decisions would be 
randomly chosen to be paid out by rolling a 10-sided die. The number that came up on the die 
decided which choice would determine the respondent’s earnings. Thus, each decision had an 
equal chance of being used in the end. Moreover, the respondent was told that s/he would get 
two vouchers, one for sooner payments and one for later payments, signed by the project 
coordinator. The voucher indicated the amount of cash and corresponding date the respondent 
could redeem the money. After the experiment, the respondent decided whether we should 
send the money to them by the postal savings bank or other commercial bank.  
To help the respondents understand the experiment, they first made two trial decisions.9 Once 
the experimenter was certain that the respondent had understood, s/he was asked to make the 
first five independent decisions about how to allocate 20 tokens between today and one month 
from today. Following the experimental design in Section 2.2, to help the respondent 
remember which dates the two plates represented, the experimenter put a sign in front of each 
plate with the corresponding date and the value of a token. The respondent then decided how 
to allocate the tokens between today and one month from today for each choice. After a 
decision was confirmed, the experimenter translated the total tokens in each plate into 
Chinese yuan and wrote the decision on the whiteboard. The experimenter then repeated the 
allocation by pointing to the whiteboard, and at this point the respondent had the possibility to 
revise the decision. If the respondent did not want to change the allocation, the experimenter 
moved on to introduce the next choice. When the respondent had finished all five decisions, 
the experimenter presented all notes on the whiteboard to her/him and asked whether s/he 
would like to change the allocation for any of the choices. If the respondent wanted to make 
changes, they were asked what they wanted to change. Once the respondent did not want to 
make any more changes, the experimenter continued to the next five independent choices, i.e., 
for allocation between two months and three months from today.  
                                                          
9 As part of the trial decisions, the respondents allocated 10 tokens between one month from today and two 
months from today. Before the respondent did this, the experimenter asked some control questions about the 
meaning of the plates and the tokens. The respondent started to make the trial decisions only when s/he had 
understood the meaning of the plates and the tokens. 
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The elicitation procedure was similar for the second five independent choices. Yet the 
respondent was reminded that s/he needed to wait for both the sooner payment (two months 
from today) and the later payment (three months from today). After the respondent had 
finished all 10 choices, s/he was asked some questions about individual characteristics. We 
intentionally arranged such interruptions before having the husband and wife made the joint 
decisions.  
When both the husband and the wife finished, they were brought together for the joint 
decisions. The couple was told that they would make 10 intertemporal choices similar to the 
individual decisions they had just made. The main difference was that both of them would 
obtain the same amount of experimental payments according to one of the decisions, which 
would be randomly selected by rolling a 10-sided die. Before each decision was made, they 
were encouraged to speak to each other and discuss the decision, as they needed to agree on 
how to allocate the money between the sooner and later dates. The couple followed the same 
elicitation method as the individual decisions, i.e., they first made joint decisions about how 
to allocate the 20 tokens between today and one month from today, and then made the other 
five joint decisions about how to allocate the 20 tokens between two months and three months 
from today.  
On average, the whole survey lasted for one and a half hours for each household. The average 
experimental payment for each individual respondent was 52 yuan, and the average 
experimental payment for each household was 208 yuan, which equals three days of non-farm 
wages for one local full-time worker. 
2.4 Order effects and initial control over the endowment 
In the design, we control for two important order effects. The first one is about the order of 
making separate decisions and joint decisions. Half of the households made the individual 
decisions first and then the joint decisions. The other half of the households made the joint 
decisions first and then the individual decisions. While the natural order would be to first 
conduct the individual experiment and then the joint, we want to test if the ordering affects the 
behavior in the joint decision experiment. There could, for example, be learning effects, or the 
respondents may try to smooth out the earnings over time and the two parts of the experiment.  
The second order effect concerns the order of the two parts of the time preference experiment. 
Half of the households answered the five questions regarding money allocated between today 
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and one month from today first, while the other half started with the five questions regarding 
money allocated between two months and three months from today.  
In addition, we control for experimenter effects by interchanging their interviewing subjects 
in each household. For example, if the male experimenter interviewed the husband and the 
couple in one household, then the female experimenter needed to interview the husband and 
couple in the next household.  
Finally, to control for the effects of who had the initial control over the tokens, we had four 
alternatives for how they were initially distributed. The first reference situation was that the 
experimenter just put the 20 tokens between the husband and the wife, but did not say 
anything else about who was responsible to put tokens on the plates. The second situation was 
that the experimenter gave the 20 tokens to the wife, making her in charge of putting the 
tokens on the plates. In the third situation, the experimenter gave the 20 tokens to the husband, 
who was initially responsible to put the tokens on the plates. The fourth situation was that the 
experimenter gave 10 tokens to the wife and 10 tokens to the husband, making both of them 
in charge of putting the tokens on the plates. For all cases, both spouses could adjust the 
amount of tokens on the plates until they had reached an agreement, i.e., they were not told 
that only one or both should put the tokens on the plates.  
3. Econometric framework 
3.1 Modeling individual decisions 
In the experiment the subjects had to decide how much of a given amount of money to 
allocate to a sooner date, 𝑐𝑡, and a later date, 𝑐𝑡+𝜏, given a certain interest rate, r, and where 𝜏 
is the delay time. Since the experiment was fairly complex and we could not ask the subjects 
to make too many decisions, we chose to keep the delay time constant (𝜏 = 1 month). This 
means that we will not obtain a full picture of their discounting preferences. In any case, we 
can describe the decision in the experiment as a utility maximization subject to a convex 
budget constraint of the following form (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012):  max    𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡+𝜏) = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽𝛿𝑢(𝑐𝑡+𝜏)      (1) 
                                                     𝑠. 𝑡.    (1 + 𝑟)𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡+𝜏 = 𝑚 
𝑢(∙) is instantaneous utility from consumption; it is assumed as an increasing and concave 
function (𝑢(∙)′ > 0 and 𝑢(∙)′′ < 0 ).   𝛽  is the present bias parameter, which is assumed 
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0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1. δ is the discount factor, and  𝛿 > 0. 𝑚 is the given experimental budget. 𝑐𝑡 and 
𝑐𝑡+𝜏 represent the experimental payments on a sooner and later date, respectively. Based on 
the different rates of return for waiting, respondents’ allocation decisions are continuous along 
the convex budget set. Given a certain value of the present bias parameter (𝛽), a rational 
individual should not decrease the amount of money allocated to the later period as the return 
to waiting increases (Choi et al., 2007, 2011). However, additional assumptions about the 
utility function are necessary in order to obtain an estimable function. Given that we do not 
have information about daily consumption expenditures, we assume a constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility: 𝑢(𝑐𝑡) = −exp (−ρ𝑐𝑡), where 𝜌  is a risk aversion parameter. By 
maximizing the utility in equation (1) subject to the convex budget constraint, we can easily 
derive the equation (2) as follows:  
𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡 = 1𝜌 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑙𝑛𝛿𝜌 𝜏 + 𝑙𝑛𝛽𝜌 𝐷𝑡=0 + 𝜀        (2) 
𝐷𝑡=0 is the present dummy that equals to one if the sooner allocations involve today payments. 
However, as explained above, in our experiment the delay time is constant and therefore the 
discount factor in the second element of the equation (2) is not estimable (it will be a 
constant).10 But we can obtain the utility curvature parameter (𝜌�) and present bias parameter 
(?̂?) by non-linear transformation of the estimated coefficients.  
3.2 Modeling the influence of individual decisions on joint decisions  
Household decisions depend on the preferences of the household members, the bargaining 
process, and the relative strengths of the household members. Since the introduction of a 
bargaining mechanism into the household decision making process by Manser and Brown 
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), there has been a development of so-called collective 
household models, which assume that households can achieve efficient decisions (Chiappori, 
1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998). According to Browning and Chiappori (1998), a 
household’s jointly discounted utility can be expressed as  
𝑉𝑗 = 𝜇ℎ ∙ 𝑈ℎ + 𝜇𝑤 ∙ 𝑈𝑤        (3) 
where 𝑉𝑗 is joint utility, 𝑈ℎ and 𝑈𝑤 represent the husband’s and wife’s utility respectively, and 
𝜇ℎ and 𝜇𝑤 denote the husband’s and wife’s decision or bargaining power respectively, which 
measures how individual preferences are aggregated into household joint decisions. One 
                                                          
10 We also cannot estimate the hyperbolic discounting parameter. 
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approach to measure the influence of spouses on household decisions is to look at who is in 
control of the income and correlate this with household decisions (see, e.g., Browning et al., 
1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Duflo, 2003). The major drawback of 
this approach is that it is, by definition, difficult to observe both individual and household 
decisions. However, using an experimental approach, it is possible to observe both individual 
and joint decisions. This in turn means that we can measure to what extent each spouse 
influences the joint decisions. We follow the approach outlined in Carlsson et al. (2011) and 
estimate the influence of each spouse by explaining the joint decisions by the individual 
decisions. The joint allocation decision for household i in choice situation j is specified as (𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑖𝑗𝐽 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝐻(𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑖𝑗𝐻 + 𝜇𝑊(𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑖𝑗𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (4) 
where J, H, and W denote decisions made jointly, by the husband, and by the wife 
respectively. Thus, the parameters 𝜇𝐻  and 𝜇𝑊  are measures of the husband’s and wife’s 
influence on the joint decision. The ratio between these two parameters, 𝜆 = 𝜇𝑊�
𝜇𝐻�
, is then a 
measure of the relative influence of the wife and the husband. If the ratio is above one, then 
the wife has a stronger influence on the joint decision. However, the above specification only 
allows us to estimate the average relative influence. We will therefore also estimate a model 
where the estimated influence parameters depend on a set of observable individual 
characteristics, by interacting the husbands’ and wives’ individual decisions with these 
variables. From this model, we can estimate the relative influence of the wife and husband for 
household i: 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜇𝚤𝑊�𝜇𝚤𝐻� . This will give us a distribution of the sampled spouses’ relative 
influence. Moreover, we can investigate whether this relative influence is correlated with 
household-specific characteristics. We therefore estimate a regression model where the 
relative influence is explained by a number of household characteristics. 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive results  
In Table 3, we summarize the allocations, in Chinese yuan, made to the sooner period by the 
husbands, wives, and couples for all the decisions.  
<Table 3 about here> 
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As can be seen, the allocation to the sooner period decreases when the rate of return increases, 
which is an indication of that the subjects are aware of the basic trade-offs they face in the 
choice tasks. On average, subjects allocate more money to later dates, except when the rate of 
return is 0.05. For example, when the rate of return is 0.25 and the sooner date is today, 
husbands’ median allocation to the sooner period is 8 Chinese yuan, and to the later period it 
is 40 Chinese yuan. The wives’ median allocation to the sooner period is 4 Chinese yuan, and 
to the later period it is 45 Chinese yuan. The median allocation in the joint decisions is 6 
Chinese yuan to the sooner period and 42.5 Chinese yuan to the later period. The table also 
reports the share of allocations that are corner allocations, i.e., when the respondent allocates 
zero yuan to the sooner period and thus allocates everything to the later period. As expected, 
the share of corner allocations increases when the rate of return increases. Finally, we can also 
look at how subjects change their allocations when the rate of return increases. If they are 
consistent, they should not decrease their allocation to the later date. We can make in total 
1,312 such comparisons.11 Among these pairs, there are only seven inconsistent pairs among 
the husbands’ decisions, nine inconsistent pairs among the wives’ decisions, and eight 
inconsistent pairs among the joint decisions. Thus, around 99% of the pairs are in line with a 
basic test of consistency. Compared with the similar study by Gine et al. (2012), where only 
81% of the pairs were consistent, this is a very high share of consistent pairs. 
To summarize, we can thus say that subjects are making trade-offs between periods that are 
consistent with economic theory, and that they are making few inconsistent choices. There is 
a relatively high share of corner allocations, but far from all decisions are corner allocations. 
As argued by Gine et al. (2012), interior allocations imply that respondents have not realized 
that they have the opportunity to smooth income over time. However, if the local credit 
market functions well, respondents should allocate all the money to the sooner period when 
the market interest is higher than the experimental return for waiting and vice versa. 
Table 3 also shows that the wives are on average more patient than the husbands, except for 
the first choice situation. Table 4 presents Wilcoxon rank sum tests of the differences between 
                                                          
11 We evaluate respondents’ basic consistency by partitioning their 10 decisions into pairs, where each element 
within each pair represents the tokens allocated to the same later dates but with the different rates of return. The 
first element within each pair is the allocation of tokens in the face of the rate of return 𝑟, which is the lowest 
rate of return. The other element is the allocation of tokens in the face of the next higher rate of return 𝑟′. Hence, 
for each timeframe, there are four such pairs, and each respondent has eight decision pairs in total. We have in 
total 164 sample households, and there are thus 1,312 decision pairs for husbands, wives, and couples, 
respectively. A consistent pair implies a pair within which the later allocation of tokens is not decreasing with 
the rate of return 𝑟. It thus also includes the cases when allocations do not change within one pair.  
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husbands’ and wives’ choices, and Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the differences between the 
joint decisions and the husbands’ and wives’ decisions.  
<Table 4 about here> 
The difference in choices between wives and husbands is statistically significant for almost all 
choice situations, i.e., wives are on average more patient than husbands. Most joint allocations 
are in between the husbands’ and wives’ allocations, with the exception of the first two 
choices. In addition, the joint decisions are significantly more patient than the husbands’ 
allocations. There are no significant differences between wives’ average allocations and joint 
allocations. However, this is looking at the aggregate level. The next step is to use the 
information at the household level.  
4.2 Husbands’ and wives’ allocation decisions 
Following the framework in Section 3.1, we regress the difference between allocations to the 
later period and the sooner period (𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡) on the rate of return, and a present time dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the sooner allocation involved the today payment. In addition, 
we estimate a model where we also include a set of observable characteristics of the subjects. 
We estimate separate models for the husbands’, wives’, and joint decisions. The estimated 
results are reported in Table 5.12 
<Table 5 about here> 
As expected, the coefficient of the rate of return is positive and highly significant. The 
significant and negative sign of the present time dummy variable indicates that respondents on 
average have present biased time preferences. This is different from Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012), who find little evidence of present bias preferences using the CTB approach. The 
utility curvature parameters are comparable with Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). 
There are actually very few observable individual characteristics that have a statistically 
significant effect on the allocation decisions. For husbands, the only significant effect is that 
in minority households, husbands allocate more money to the sooner period, i.e., are more 
impatient. For wives, we find that older women allocate more to the later period, i.e., are more 
patient. Furthermore, in households with many children under 16 years of age, wives allocate 
                                                          
12 We have also estimated a model with the log of the difference in allocations, and the results are similar to the 
ones for the level model. The results are available upon request.  
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more to the sooner period. Finally, we find that subjects who had more confidence in that they 
would actually get paid were more likely to allocate money to the later period. While this may 
be an indication that some subjects did not trust us, and hence preferred to receive the money 
today, it is also possible that it is just an indication of a rationalization of the behavior in the 
experiment. Moreover, the fraction of husbands and wives who did not trust that they would 
get paid in the future was rather low, 5% and 4% respectively13. For the joint decisions, we 
find that in households where the husband is a communist party member, the joint decisions 
are more patient, while if the husband has a higher education than primary school, the joint 
decisions are more impatient. There are no significant effects of wives’ characteristics on joint 
decisions. In households with a large number of children under 16 years of age, joint 
decisions are also more impatient. 
4.3 Order effects 
We controlled for order and experimenter effects in all models. There were two order effects: 
(i) the order of making separate and joint decisions and (ii) the order of the two parts of the 
time preference experiment. The first ordering does not have any significant effect on the 
behavior in the individual or joint decisions. The second ordering significantly affects only 
husbands’ decisions. When husbands make the five choices between today and one month 
from today first, they tend to allocate more to sooner periods compared with if they make 
these five choices in the second part of the individual experiment. The first finding is of 
particular interest, since it suggests that the decisions in the joint part of the experiment do not 
depend on whether they have answered individually first. It means that we can rule out factors 
such as learning and smoothing of the earnings over the course of the experiment. Finally, we 
also find some evidence that female experimenters have a negative effect on wives’ later 
allocations; i.e., with female experimenters wives become more impatient, yet this is 
significant only at the 10 % level. 
4.4 The effects of individual decisions on joint decisions in the experiment 
We now move to the main interest of this paper: the relationship between the individual 
decisions and the joint decisions. We first estimate models where we explain the joint 
decisions with the husbands’ and wives’ decisions, as specified in equation 4. Again we only 
                                                          
13 If we exclude the households who have any doubts about future payments, we obtain similar results as those 
reported in Table 5. The results are available upon request. 
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report results for the level form specification, although the results are similar for the log form 
specification. The results are reported in Table 6.14 
<Table 6 about here> 
In the first model, we only control for the husbands’ and wives’ individual decisions. As can 
be seen, both spouses have a significant impact on the joint decision in the sense that there is a 
positive and significant correlation between the individual decisions and the joint decision. 
However, both coefficients are well below one, suggesting that on average neither spouse has 
complete control over the joint decision. As discussed above, the relative influence of the two 
spouses can be estimated as the ratio between the wife’s individual decision coefficient and 
the husband’s individual decision coefficient. This parameter is 0.73, which means that the 
husband on average has a stronger influence on the joint decision than the wife. The value of 
the relative influence parameter has a clear and simple explanation. It is the ratio of marginal 
effects of the two spouses’ influence on the joint decisions. The husbands’ influence 
parameter is around 0.49. This means that if the husband allocates, say, 10 yuan more to the 
later period in the individual experiment, then the later period allocation in the joint 
experiment increases by 4.9 yuan. For the wife, the increase in the joint experiment for the 
same change is 73% of this, i.e. 3.6 yuan. Moreover, we can reject the hypothesis that the 
relative influence parameter is equal to one (p-value=0.07). 
In the second model, we interact the spouses’ individual decisions with the treatment dummy 
variables concerning who had initial control over the tokens. As can be seen, none of the 
interaction terms are significant. This is different from the study by de Palma et al. (2011), 
where, in an experiment on risky choices, women who ultimately implement the joint 
decisions show more decision power.  
In order to say more about what factors are correlated with the extent of the influence on the 
joint decision, we next estimate three additional models. In the first model the individual 
decisions are interacted with a set of individual characteristics. In the second model we add 
two sets of variables. The first set is a dummy variable equal to one if the husband/wife 
claimed to have experienced conflicts over financial decisions in the past. The second set is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the husband/wife stated that he/she is the primary decision 
maker when it comes to savings in the household.  In the third model, we add two interaction 
                                                          
14 We control for experimenter gender and the two order effects in all models. There are no significant gender or 
order effects. 
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terms between wife’s and husband’s decisions and a dummy variable equals to one if the 
husband is more patient than the wife. We do this since we find that husbands in general are 
more impatient and at the same time have stronger bargaining power. In order to investigate if 
this holds at the household level as well we include these two interaction terms. The results 
are presented in Table 7. 
<Table 7 about here> 
Again, there are relatively few significant effects. For husbands we find no significant effects 
in the first model. For wives we find that if a wife has more than primary schooling she has a 
stronger influence. Our findings are to some extent comparable to previous findings. For 
example Carlsson et al. (2009) also find that more educated wives have more influence on 
joint decisions in risk choices. Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) find that the relatively higher 
education can increase males’ decision power in camping choice. This indicates that 
education has played an important role in improving spouses’ decision making power in 
household decision making.  
The second model reveals that there is some correlation between influence on the joint 
decision and real life decisions on savings, although not a strong one. In households where the 
husband states that he primarily makes the decisions on savings, he also has a stronger 
influence on joint decisions. However, a history of financial conflicts in the households does 
not correlate with the influence of the spouses. 
In the third model, we do not find that more patient husbands have significantly stronger 
influence on the joint decisions. Thus it is not the relative patience or impatience of the 
spouses that affect the bargaining power. This is interesting and to some extent inconsistent 
with the theoretical prediction that demonstrates the important role of patience for the 
bargaining power (Rubinstein, 1982; Binmore et al., 1986).  
Finally, based on the first model in Table 7, we estimate spouses’ influence and the relative 
influence on the joint decisions. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 8, and the 
distribution of the relative influence is plotted in Figure 1. 
<Table 8 about here> 
<Figure 1 about here> 
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There is some variation in the influence of the spouses and hence the relative influence. The 
average relative influence is 0.97, which is higher than what we found in the model without 
socio-economic characteristics. This is explained by a few observations with a high relative 
influence for wives. The median is also higher: 0.96. The ratio of relative influence is lower 
than one in 59% of the households. Consequently, although husbands have stronger influence 
in a majority of the households, there is a fair share of households where the wife actually has 
a stronger influence than the husband. In comparison, Carlsson et al. (2011) found in a similar 
study in China that there were very few households where the wife had a stronger influence 
than the husband. It is of course difficult to make a direct comparison, since the experimental 
method, context, and location of the experiment were different. This points to the difficulties 
with generalizing findings from a single experiment.  
The relatively low variation in relative influence is explained by the fact that few of the 
individual observable characteristics are significant in the model in Table 7. However, in the 
last step we will estimate a model with the relative influence as the dependent variable and a 
set of household characteristics as independent variables. The results are reported in Table 9.  
<Table 9 about here> 
Again, only a few of the observable household characteristics are significant. If the household 
is a minority household, then the wife has less influence on the joint decision. Interestingly, 
the longer the couple has been married, the stronger the influence of the wife. But for 
households with many children younger than 16, the wife has less influence on joint decisions. 
Finally, if the spouses agree that it is mainly the husband who makes decisions on savings, 
then the wife has less influence on the joint decisions in the experiment as well. In contrast to 
the present study, Carlsson et al. (2011) do not find any other significant household 
characteristics that could affect the wife’s relative influence than the dummy for whether the 
couple is living with husband’s parents.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated the influence of spouses’ preferences on joint decisions 
regarding intertemporal allocations. We have also examined how the influence in the 
experiment is related to household and individual characteristics, and households’ actual 
decisions on savings. We did this by conducting a high stake field experiment with 164 
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married couples in rural China, and used the Convex Time Budget experimental method to 
elicit individual and joint time preferences.  
In general, we find that both wives and joint decisions show more patience than husbands, 
which provides complementary evidence of misaligned time preferences between spouses 
(Schaner, 2012). Furthermore, both individual and joint decisions exhibit present-biased time 
preferences. We find that both husbands and wives have an influence on the joint decisions, 
but on average husbands have a stronger influence than wives. In particular, husbands have a 
stronger influence on the joint decisions in 59% of the households. Thus, in 41% of 
households, wives have a stronger influence. However, few observable individual and 
household characteristics are significantly correlated with the spouses’ relative influence on 
joint decisions, which is in line with the moderate variation in relative influence at the 
household level. Interestingly, we find a link between relative influence in the experiment and 
the households’ decisions on financial savings in real life. Husbands who mainly make 
decisions on savings also have a stronger influence on the joint decisions in the experiment.  
We present some interesting results regarding the design of this type of experiment. In 
particular, we show that the order in which the individual and joint decisions are presented 
does not affect the decisions. This is important since one critique against these experiments is 
that the behavior in the joint decision is affected by the fact that the respondents have just 
made choices individually. Moreover, in an attempt to affect the influence of the spouses on 
the joint decisions, we had a set of treatments where the initial control over the endowment 
was given to one of the spouses. This did not affect the influence of the spouses, however. 
One explanation for this could be that the treatment was not strong enough (it was not 
intended to be stronger). Future research should, among other things, look into what 
exogenous factors could affect the relative influence of the spouses, and whether the effects 
are similar between husbands and wives. For example, it would be interesting if the spouses 
had to earn the endowments in a real effort experiment, and then investigate to what extent 
they have influence over the resources. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of individual and household characteristics (N = 164 households) 
Variables 
Husband Wife 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Individual characteristics     
Age (years) 48.78 9.34 46.26 9.11 
Higher than primary school (1=yes) 0.50  0.19  
Communist party (1=yes) 0.12  0.01  
Individual attitudes     
General decision maker 
(1=husband; 2=joint; 3=wife) 
1.24 0.46 1.38 0.59 
Wife income contribution 0.40 0.17 0.39 0.17 
Husband income contribution 0.60 0.17 0.61 0.17 
Decision maker on savings 
(1=husband; 2=joint; 3=wife) 
1.31 0.49 1.34 0.51 
Decision maker on daily expense 
(1=husband; 2=joint; 3=wife) 
2.36 0.78 2.18 0.81 
Decision maker for durable goods 
(1=husband; 2=joint; 3=wife) 
1.55 0.53 1.55 0.61 
Decision maker for expensive fixed asset 
(1=husband; 2=joint; 3=wife) 
1.55 0.52 1.50 0.54 
If conflict with spouse in the past (1=yes) 0.09  0.17 0.38 
Trust payments will be received 
(1= do not trust at all; 2=do not quite trust; 3=neither trust 
nor  not trust; 4= trust somewhat; 5=trust completely) 
4.56 0.82 4.49 0.77 
Household characteristics     
Household is minority (1=yes) 0.15    
Household size (persons) 4.98 1.50   
The length of marriage (years) 26.06 9.80   
The number of children less than 16 years old 0.85 0.85   
The number of adults older than 60 years old 0.56 0.82   
If the couple is living with the husband’s parents (1=yes) 0.24    
If household experienced serious illness or death in the last 
two years (1=yes) 
0.34    
Log of equivalence scaled total gross income (yuan) 9.03 0.68   
Log of equivalence scaled total assets (yuan) 9.34 0.89   
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Table 2. Description of the 10 decisions in the time preference experiment 
Sooner date Later date Token budget Interest rate 
Sooner value of 
one token 
Later value of 
one token 
0 30 20 0.05 2 2.1 
0 30 20 0.1 2 2.2 
0 30 20 0.25 2 2.5 
0 30 20 0.4 2 2.8 
0 30 20 0.6 2 3.2 
60 90 20 0.05 2 2.1 
60 90 20 0.1 2 2.2 
60 90 20 0.25 2 2.5 
60 90 20 0.4 2 2.8 
60 90 20 0.6 2 3.2 
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Table 3. Husband’s, wife’s and joint allocations to the sooner period in Chinese yuan 
 
Notes: 1. Figures the parentheses are standard deviation.  
            2. Share corner is the percentage of zero allocation to the sooner period  
 
  
 
 Husband Wife Joint 
Sooner 
date 
R Mean Median Share corner Mean Median 
Share 
corner Mean Median 
Share 
corner 
0 0.05 
22.5 
(16.2) 24 23% 
24.1 
(15.9) 28 17% 
20.8 
(15.8) 20 24% 
0 0.1 
18.4 
(15.9) 16 28% 
17.9 
(15.1) 19 26% 
16.5 
(15.2) 16 30% 
0 0.25 
12.7 
(14.3) 8 39% 
10.0 
(12.9) 4 48% 
10.3 
(12.6) 6 44% 
0 0.4 
9.7 
(13.2) 2 49% 
7.0 
(11.3) 0 59% 
7.8 
(11.7) 0 52% 
0 0.6 
7.1 
(12.2) 0 62% 
4.3 
(9.5) 0 76% 
4.9 
(9.9) 0 70% 
60 0.05 
16.8 
(14.9) 17 30% 
12.7 
(13.5) 10 38% 
14.7 
(15.0) 12 37% 
60 0.1 
11.9 
(13.1) 8 40% 
8.9 
(11.9) 4 47% 
9.6 
(12.0) 4 47% 
60 0.25 
8.2 
(11.5) 0 51% 
4.8 
(8.4) 0 64% 
6.2 
(9.6) 0 58% 
60 0.4 
5.8 
(10.0) 0 60% 
2.9 
(6.7) 0 77% 
4.1 
(8.1) 0 68% 
60 0.6 
3.8 
(8.7) 0 73% 
2.0 
(5.6) 0 84% 
2.5 
(7.1) 0 83% 
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Table 4. Non-parametric difference tests between husband’s, wife’s and joint decisions 
on sooner allocations in Chinese yuan 
  Husband-Wife Joint-Husband Joint-Wife 
Sooner date r Difference Z-value1 Difference Z-value2 Difference Z-value2 
0 0.05 -1.6 -0.93 -1.7 -1.16       -3.3*** -3.09 
0 0.1  0.5 0.14 -1.9 -0.60 -1.4 -1.42 
0 0.25   2.7* 1.85     -2.4** -2.35 0.3 0.11 
0 0.4     2.7** 1.96     -1.9** -2.12 0.8 0.04 
0 0.6       2.8*** 2.70     -2.2** -2.45 0.6 0.40 
60 0.05      4.1*** 2.44  -2.1* -1.68  2.0* 1.85 
60 0.1    3.0** 2.05    -2.3** -2.40 0.7 1.38 
60 0.25      3.4*** 2.80      -2.0*** -3.05 1.4 1.58 
60 0.4      2.9*** 3.41      -1.7*** -3.21     1.2** 2.05 
60 0.6    1.8** 2.34      -1.3*** -3.76 0.5 0.91 
Notes:  1. Z-value1is Wilcoxon rank sum test; Z-value2is Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
             2. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 5. Estimated results for regression models for husband’s, wife’s, and joint 
decisions; dependent variable is the difference between later and sooner allocations 
(𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡) 
Variables Husband Wife Joint 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interest rate (ln(1+r)) 
  110.025*** 
(5.156) 
  110.025*** 
(5.167) 
  118.737*** 
(4.745) 
  118.737*** 
(4.754) 
 111.131*** 
(4.533) 
  111.131*** 
(4.547) 
Present time dummy 
(1=today) 
  -10.686*** 
(1.905) 
  -10.686*** 
(1.909) 
  -13.918*** 
(1.685) 
 -13.918*** 
(1.688) 
  -10.309*** 
(1.635) 
 -10.309*** 
(1.641) 
Husband trust payments 
(scale from 1 to 5) 
 
  6.496** 
(2.647) 
   
2.261 
(1.879) 
Husband age (years)  
-0.034 
(0.185) 
   
-0.105 
(0.451) 
Husband higher than primary 
school (1=yes) 
 
-4.830 
(4.172) 
   
-6.569* 
(3.576) 
Husband communist party 
member (1=yes) 
 
-1.122 
(4.730) 
   
7.090* 
(3.688) 
Wife trust payments 
(scale from 1 to 5) 
   
  4.676** 
(1.838) 
 
0.772 
(2.097) 
Wife age (years)    
0.311* 
(0.163) 
 
0.383 
(0.456) 
Wife higher than primary school 
(1=yes) 
   
-6.693 
(4.315) 
 
0.226 
(4.491) 
Household is minority (1=yes)  
-11.590* 
(6.703) 
 
0.991 
(5.152) 
 
-1.772 
(5.737) 
Log of equivalence scaled total 
gross income (yuan) 
 
0.089 
(2.526) 
 
-1.537 
(2.181) 
 
1.055 
(2.758) 
The number of children below 
age 16 
 
-1.295 
(2.190) 
 
-3.449* 
(1.834) 
 
-3.657* 
(1.891) 
Constant 
9.935 
(6.844) 
-11.682 
(29.759) 
12.127** 
(5.758) 
-3.595 
(22.601) 
 13.344** 
(6.630) 
-17.598 
(30.103) 
Utility curvature parameter(𝜌�) 
   0.009*** 
(0.0004) 
 
    0.008*** 
(0.0003) 
 
   0.009*** 
(0.0004) 
 
Present bias parameter(?̂?) 
     0.907*** 
(0.016) 
 
     0.889*** 
(0.013) 
 
     0.911*** 
(0.013) 
 
Observations 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 
R-squared 0.284 0.319 0.376 0.418 0.322 0.355 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the difference between sooner and later allocations in level form: C1-C0. 
            2. Standard errors of utility curvature parameter and present bias parameter are obtained by delta method. 
            3. All regressions are clustered at household level. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
            4. We control for order and experimenter effects in all the regressions. We also control for initial control effects in Columns (5) and (6).  
            5. Village fixed effects are also controlled in all regressions.  
            6. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Estimated results for regression models for joint allocation decisions; 
dependent variable is the difference between later and sooner allocations (𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡) 
 (1) (2) 
Husband’s decision 
     0.492*** 
(0.045) 
     0.508*** 
(0.081) 
Wife’s decision 
     0.359*** 
(0.041) 
    0.353*** 
(0.087) 
Husband’s decision× 20 tokens to wife  0.052 
(0.124) 
Husband’s decision× 20 tokens to husband  -0.142 
(0.116) 
Husband’s decision× 10 tokens to each  0.021 
(0.097) 
Wife’s decision ×  20 tokens to wife  -0.037 
(0.134) 
Wife’s decision×  20 tokens to husband  0.081 
(0.120) 
Wife’s decision× 10 tokens to each  -0.020 
(0.101) 
Constant 
 8.975** 
(3.770) 
 9.276** 
(3.607) 
Observations 1640 1640 
R-squared 0.590 0.595 
Notes: 1. Joint, husband’s and wife’s decision is the difference between sooner and later allocations in level form: C1-C0. 
           2. All the regressions are clustered at household level.  Figures in the parentheses are robust standard errors.  
           3. We control for order and experimenter effects in all the regressions.   
           4. Village fixed effects are also controlled in all the regressions.  
           5. *, **, and *** represent the significant level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7. Estimated results for regression models for joint allocation decisions; dependent 
variable is the difference between later and sooner allocations (𝑐𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑐𝑡), with 
interaction terms for husband’s and wife’s decisions. 
Individual decisions × Individual 
characteristics 
Level form regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
Husband decision 
   0.489** 
(0.218) 
  0.474** 
(0.218) 
 0.381* 
(0.225) 
Wife decision 
0.196 
(0.193) 
0.179 
(0.185) 
0.289 
(0.198) 
Husband decision × absolute difference between 
husband and wife sooner decision  
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Wife decision × absolute difference between 
husband and wife sooner decision 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Husband decision × dummy if husband is more 
patient than wife 
  
0.146 
(0.104) 
Wife decision × dummy if husband is more patient 
than wife 
  
-0.074 
(0.112) 
Husband decision × husband age (years) -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Husband decision × husband higher than primary 
school (1=yes) 
-0.006 
(0.036) 
-0.014 
(0.037) 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
Husband decision × husband communist party 
member (1=yes) 
-0.061 
(0.048) 
-0.048 
(0.047) 
-0.042 
(0.045) 
Husband decision × If husband answered financial 
conflict with spouse (1=yes) 
 
-0.060 
(0.066) 
-0.067 
(0.064) 
Husband decision × If husband answered it’s him 
making decisions on financial savings (1=yes) 
 
0.062* 
(0.034) 
 0.061* 
(0.034) 
Wife decision × wife age (years) 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Wife decision × wife higher than primary school 
(1=yes) 
 0.073* 
(0.041) 
0.081* 
(0.041) 
   0.083** 
(0.040) 
Wife decision × If wife answered financial conflict 
with spouse (1=yes) 
 
0.026 
(0.043) 
0.033 
(0.043) 
Wife decision × If wife answered it’s her making 
decisions on financial savings (1=yes) 
 
0.049 
(0.036) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
Constant 
  9.824** 
(4.373) 
9.873** 
(4.350) 
 8.176* 
(4.271) 
Observations 1640 1640 1640 
R-squared 0.596 0.599 0.600 
Notes: 1. Joint, husband’s and wife’s decision is the difference between sooner and later allocations in level form: C1-C0. 
            2. All regressions are clustered at household level.  Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
            3. We control for initial control effects, order effects and experimenter effects in all the regressions.   
            4. Village fixed effects are also controlled in all the regressions.  
            5. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8. Estimated results for husbands’ and wives’ influence, and wives’ relative influence 
Individual 
influence 
Mean Std. Dev 
10th 
percentile 
25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
Husband’s 
influence 
0.46 0.05 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.51 
Wife’s influence 0.44 0.05 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.50 
Wife’s relative 
influence 
0.97 0.17 0.76 0.84 0.96 1.08 1.20 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The distribution of wives’ relative influences 
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Table 9. Estimated results for regression model on wives’ relative influence 
Household characteristics Coefficients 
Wife older (1=yes) 
0.012 
(0.033) 
Wife more educated (1=yes) 
0.041 
(0.031) 
Wife’s income contribution (%) 
-0.020 
(0.075) 
Household is minority (1=yes) 
  -0.069** 
(0.031) 
Log of equivalence scaled total gross income (yuan) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
Length of marriage (years) 
     0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Number of children under 16 years old 
-0.022* 
(0.013) 
If household experienced serious illness or death in the past two years (1=yes) 
 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
If couple is living with husband’s parents(1=yes) 
-0.023 
(0.025) 
If financial conflict with spouse(1=yes) 
0.017 
(0.023) 
If both husband and wife agreed that husband makes decisions on savings (1=yes) 
  -0.045** 
(0.023) 
If both husband and wife agreed that they jointly make decisions on savings (1=yes) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
Constant 
   0.667*** 
(0.149) 
Observations 164 
R-squared 0.464 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.  
             2. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
